The Iran newspaper analyzed what it described as a shift in Trump’s strategy. The paper writes: It appears that nearly two months after the start of the war, and with battlefield limitations becoming clear, Trump’s effort to redefine the war’s objectives and shift its weight from the battlefield to the realm of narrative and perception has become the central axis of US policy. Within this framework, the various claims about progress in negotiations or Iran’s willingness to reach an agreement reflect less the realities on the ground and more an information operation aimed at preserving a controlled image of the war’s trajectory.

 This trend also became evident in the ceasefire episode and Trump’s unilateral announcement of its extension. Based on this, the war at its current stage is defined less by military action alone and more by a competition to shape reality and control narratives — with the difference that for Washington, narrative‑building has increasingly taken on a compensatory role to manage battlefield setbacks.

Hamshahri: How does the Strait of Hormuz remain ‘passable’ but not ‘normal’?
Hamshahri wrote in a note on the closure of the Strait of Hormuz: Although in peacetime there is no absolute right to close and collect tolls from transit passage, the law of the seas provides countries adjacent to such waterways with tools, from maritime safety and traffic management to declaring temporary security restrictions. If the situation changes to hostilities, the tools of naval warfare are added to these conditions. For this reason, a more accurate description of the situation in Hormuz is not that it is closed, but that it is not normally passable and is under tight control. This small difference in terminology makes a big difference in international analysis: Tehran does not need to declare that it ‘closed the strait’; it is enough to show that it is implementing its rules and security considerations in its territorial waters. The practical result for global shipping is not much different from a blockade, but from a legal perspective, Iran’s narrative remains more defensible.

Resalat: Diplomacy in a suspended state

Resalat analyzed the ambiguous conditions in the negotiations between Iran and the United States. The newspaper wrote: The decision to continue or suspend the negotiations has now become a variable dependent on the battlefield behavior of the other side. At present, the diplomatic process has neither completely declared defeat nor developed the necessary dynamics to progress. This suspended state is a direct result of Washington's attempt to buy time and measure Iran's resilience to combined pressures. Therefore, the possibility of a new round of negotiations will only increase if a geopolitical shock or double domestic/international pressure forces the United States to change its calculations and accept Iran's initial conditions. Otherwise, the repetition of fruitless meetings will only lead to the erosion of diplomacy.

Ettelaat: Trump lacks the authority to declare a ceasefire  

Ettelaat examined the reasoning behind Trump’s ceasefire announcement. The article stated: This ceasefire has neither military value nor value under international law. A ceasefire must also be subject to continuous monitoring. Moreover, the United States has already nullified the ceasefire by imposing a naval blockade and attacking Iranian vessels. Therefore, in practice, Trump does not possess the necessary authority to declare a ceasefire. At this point, Iran’s hands are completely open to take any military action within the framework of wartime conditions and to deliver the necessary blows against the United States. By imposing a superficial ceasefire, the US is seeking to buy time to prepare itself for the next phase, to become more equipped, and to use the ceasefire to strengthen the element of surprise for any potential future military operation.

Donya‑e‑Eqtesad: Three scenarios for the post‑ceasefire future  

With the ceasefire between Iran and the United States extended indefinitely, three scenarios may unfold in the coming days. First, the ceasefire could lead both sides back to the negotiating table and result in an initial framework agreement in Islamabad. The second scenario is that the ceasefire — which Trump has declared open‑ended — continues for a period of one month. Given the intensifying naval blockade and clashes in the Strait of Hormuz, one side may eventually retreat from its position, leading back to the first scenario. The third scenario is that the ceasefire does not last long and that within a few days, hostilities resume. Considering the escalating tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and the continuation of the US naval blockade, this scenario is not only plausible but could become highly likely, especially given Israel’s approach and the pressure it exerts on Washington.